ESSAYS ON POLITICAL ECONOMICSAuthor:
TICCHI DAVIDE.
Year:
2003.
University:
POMPEU FABRA [
www.upf.edu].
Place of defense: DEPARTAMENTO DE ECONOMIA Y EMPRESA.
Place of preparation: DEPARTAMENTO DE ECONOMIA Y EMPRESA.
Summary: In the first chapter of that thesis, presents a theory of democratic choice between two alternatives, a majority consensus and the other in a society with inequalities. It shows that a majoritarian democracy has a smaller government and lower taxation front of a consensual democracy. A consensual system is preferred by a society with a relatively low level of inequality, while a majoritarian system is preferred when the level of inequality is relatively high. Furthermore, it demonstrates that democracies consensus will be governed by coalitions of the center-left, while the right will take advantage democracies majority. The second chapter investigates the role of international conflicts in the transition from autarchy to democracy. It is argued that if a country is threatened externally, its elite can be compelled to encourage greater democracy or the redistribution of income to create greater incentives among the masses to participate in the possible war. This will increase the chances of survival of both the country and its elite. The third chapter poses and attempts to answer the question: How  some institutional characteristics of an army condition their willingness to sustain coups against a democratic government? It is argued that the presence of a professional army could not discourage the coups of an economic elite against a democracy as it is more expensive to "buy" their services compared to a professional army. Therefore, a professional army may not be the most appropriate choice for institutional democracy in a consolidation phase. The fourth chapter examines the role of risk aversion and the intertemporal substitution model in a dynamic investment. The most important result to emerge is that risk aversion by itself can not explain the negative relationship between aggregate investment and uncertainty added as long as the effect of growing uncertainty about investment also depends on the elasticity of intertemporal substitution.
