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SOLUTIONS COOPERATIVES AND NON-COOPERATIVE IN ECONOMIES WITH DIFFERENTIATED INFORMATIONAuthor: FUGAROLAS ALVAREZ-UDE GUADALUPE. Year: 2004. University: VIGO. Place of defense: FACULTAD DE CC. ECONÓMICAS Y EMPRESARIALES. Place of preparation: FACULTAD DE CC. ECONÓMICAS Y EMPRESARIALES. Summary: The thesis discusses the solution of balance in general equilibrium models in which there is uncertainty and information agents is asymmetric. More specifically focuses on those economies with differentiated information which continue providing Radner (1968). In addition to a literature review on the savings with information type Radner, attests that the information is differentiated. It shows how the private information of each agent describes events observed in all possible states and then introduced the idea of compatibility with private information through the factorization of the action plans under each state of nature through the application associated with each state the event that the officer perceives as its information. This formalization contain the individual cases referred to the above definitions in the literature (medibilidad respect to sigma algebra generated by the information, consumption equal in states that do not differ, and so on.). It introduces the subspace action plans informacionalmente eligible to formalize an order, which is necessarily partial, in the joint information agents. It shows that if an agent is at least as well informed other then you have a better chance to choose their action plans. It is a result of the existence of competitive balance private solution containing the balance Tadner (1968), in an economy with information on which preferences are represented for utility functions defined on the sets of consumption through the states that are subsets generic space merchandise. Also discusses the free availability of resources and balance shows that in competitive balance private emptied all markets provided that the preferences are strictly monotonous and as a state of nature there is an agent which distinguishes it. Moreover, it extends the analysis Schmeidler (1980) to economies with differentiated information and an economy with financial uncertainty where the structure of markets for real assets is incomplete. From these economies are defined gaming partners in a normal way and it is shown that their balances of Nash equilibria competitive match private and balances competitive economies and financial information, respectively. ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF THE CONTROL OF CLIMATE CHANGE IN SPAINAuthor: GONZÁLEZ RUIZ DE EGUINO MIGUEL. Year: 2005. University: PAÍS VASCO. Place of defense: FACULTAD DE CIENCIAS ECONÓMICAS Y EMPRESARIALES. Place of preparation: UNIVERSIDAD DEL PAÍS VASCO/EHU.
Summary: This dissertation implements a multi-sectoral dynamic model applied general equilibrium rate Ramsey, to investigate the economic impacts of reducing coste-efecientes of greenhouse emissions in Spain. A central aspect of the work lies in calculating and analyzing the long-term economic impacts arising from the implementation of the Kyoto Protocol. Work is also studying various alternative scenarios to know the impact of potential future changes in the goals and deadlines for compliance with these policies. Also performs various simulations of fiscal reforms, which replaced imputos on capital, labor or consumption tax on emissions, to discuss options for economic gain and environmental simultaneously (hypothesis of 'double dividend'). Finally, exploring different instruments to achieve these objectives. This Designing a market in emission permits, the introduction of various taxes on energy, petroleum, coal and electricity and the establishment of quotas. These instruments are analyzed on the basis of their performance in terms of overall efficiency and according to the distribution of costs by generating sectors.
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