THE RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN THE ECONOMIC CYCLE AND POLICY CYCLE. THEORETICAL ANALYSIS AND APPLICATION TO THE SPANISH ECONOMY.Author:
CARLOS VILLAMARÍN PABLO DE.
Year: 2005.
University:
VIGO.
Place of defense: FACULTADE DE CC. ECONÓMICAS E EMPRESARIALES.
Place of preparation: IDEGA Y FACULTADE DE ECONÓMICAS E EMPRESARIAIS DE SANTIAGO DE COMPOSTELA.
Summary: The thesis deals with the analysis, theoretical and empirical, the relationship of interdependence in democratic capitalist societies drawn between the economy and politics, with special attention to the phenomenon of economic cycles politically motivated. In the first part of the job, but is reviewed in detail the economic cycle politically motivated described by Kalecki, the focus is moving towards the model of economic cycles politically motivated developed in the neoclassical analysis of the political and interdependence, explaining how a democratic government that seeks to achieve its own goals and interests can generate cyclical fluctuations in the economy. The review covers literature, both theoretical and empirical, which has been dealing with this phenomenon, as well as several prominent extensions. In the second part of the job, develops a model that incorporates behavioral patterns of the players involved in the political game provided by the models neoc1ásicosde interdependence to a political-economic structure characterized by a theoretical development away from the usual approach in the analysis macroeconomic conventional, as is proposed by Goodwin. In addition to formally raise and resolve this model illustrates some of its key findings through numerical simulations, for the achievement of which are used data from the Spanish economy. Overall, it shows that the coming to power of political groups with different goals partisan, reflected in the stance of fiscal policy in the light of changing economic variables are most concerned about their hypothetical followers affects differently to the macroeconomic stability of a system that generates cyclical fluctuations of endogenously. However, the presence of an independent institution responsible for managing monetary policy can alter the results achieved by the government. Similarly, the possibility that the government could force the central bank to monetize a portion of the public debt broadens the range of possible outcomes which leads to the implementation of policies demand by economic authorities not neutral. In particular, when the monetization is sufficiently intense invested effects generated by the actions of executives partisan prosecutor. Finally, in a complementary way, are estimated several versions of the role of prosecutor in reaction underlying the model for democratic governments Spaniards of the period 1984-2001.La evidence indicates that the four executives socialists and the two popular Orthodox involved reacted so in response to the pace of change in the inflation rate. In addition, the estimated regressions showed that the influence of the institutional context, the whole process of European integration and stability in the Spanish political system, over the direction of fiscal policy. More weak is the evidence on the existence of partisan purposes and / or opportunistic.
