FISCAL THEORY

Author: RIGALL TORRENT RICARD.
Year: 2003.
University: GIRONA.
Place of defense: CIENCIAS ECONOMICAS Y EMPRESARIALES.
Place of preparation: FAC. DE CIÉNCIES ECONÒMIQUES I EMPRESARIALS (UDG).

Summary: The thesis deals with various aspects concerning public finances locales.El work is divided into three chapters that share a common method of analysis. Each chapter starts with a brief statement of the relevance of the issue in question and a brief overview of the tilteratura more derectamente related to the topic to tratar.A following is modeled situation through economic analysis to reveal different relevant aspects of the problem and the relationship between them. This analysis serves on the three articles in support of the empirical analysis that takes place in a second etapa.El analysis serve in the three articles in support of the empirical analysis that takes place in an segund etapa.El empirical analysis allows, through a statistical analysis sescriptivo first, and later edconométrico verify the assumptions and quantify the magnitude of the different effects of interest. Finally, from the results obtained can draw the appropriate conclusions and provide appropriate policy proposals pair correct the problems identified. Turning to the content of each of the three chapters of the thesis, the first chapter presents a discussion about different factors raltivos to consolidate the municipal and solving problems dela lack of public services in the municipios.Se detects that the number of inhabitants and the number of municipal per capita in the municipality and quantify the different effects in the case of Spanish municipalities. The second chapter discusses the impact of tourism on the precise location of gracious offer private tourist. It is a fact that municipalities difirentes have different endowments of sevicios public and natural capital and that these attributes complement the private offer of hotel services. Variations between municipalities around complementary do exist diferncias price due only to the locality in which the hotel.Para analyze these aspects, it is estimated the effect of the town on the price of hotels and is interpreted as meaning reflect differences in public services. Natural Capital and brand image in different localities of the Catalan coast Finally, the third chapter is devoted to the analysis of the financial imbalance of municipalities tour. It analyzes and quantifies the financial problem of municipalities tourist Catalans, providing information obtained from data cleared budgets for municipalities catalanes.El work which is allowed to conduct a discussion of various proposals correct.

Author: CAMPOY MIÑARRO JUAN CRISTÓBAL.
Year: 2004.
University: MURCIA.
Place of defense: FACULTAD DE ECONOMÍA Y EMPRESA.
Place of preparation: FACULTAD DE ECONOMÍA Y EMPRESA.

Summary: In the last decade we have seen, within the European Monetary Union (EMU), two basic facts that have severely limited the influence of national governments in the process of determination of macroeconomic policies. First, each member state has renounced implement independent monetary and exchange rate policies. These have been delegated to a new institution like the European Central Bank (ECB), which has been given a high degree of autonomy with respect to the Governments of the member states of the union. Secondly, with the signing of the Stability and Growth Pact (SGP), the EMU has designed a set of rules that limit the fiscal sovereignty of member countries. This reform process arises from the conviction, both politically and academic influence of the central government institutions and rules exerted on the outcome of economic policies. In this regard, one of the most important tasks of policy makers lies in the optimal design of an institutional framework that imposes rules of action appropriate to the economic authorities. This economic reality is part of this memory, whose goal is to contribute to the debate on what is the impact on the economic performance of the institutions and rules that govern monetary and fiscal policies. The organization of the same is divided into different chapters, the development of which we summarize briefly below: Following the introductory chapter, the second shows the main input from the literature that have served as a reference in the preparation of this work. They have focused their attention on the importance of institutional reforms and the establishment of rules when there is a problem whose origin is in: (a) the lack of anti-inflationary credibility of the monetary authorities and / or (b) the existence of externalities in monetary and fiscal policy. One main conclusion from these studies is that, through proper design of institutions and rules, it is possible to create a framework that will provide the necessary incentives to achieve socially optimal policies. The chapter ends with an initial contribution on our part to the existing literature. This provision (section 2.4) formalizes the establishment of the sanctions provided for in the PEC. To this end we raise a game in several stages which highlights the strategic aspects of such an agreement. The third chapter is part of the literature studying the establishment of incentives to the central bank, so as to reduce the problem of anti-inflationary credibility that it presents versus the private sector. However, unlike literature, we allow the possibility that the main (company or government) will result in a cost delivered to the transfer agent (monetary institution). In this scenario, the objective of this chapter is to analyze the strategic interactions that arise between the principal, the private sector and the agent, as well as characterize the optimal scheme of incentives that should be the central bank. This is done at two possible scenarios. First, in a context principal-agente both symmetric and asymmetric information under on the relative valuation on the transfer agent has received. Secondly, in an environment of information symmetrical but where the principal has the ability to unilaterally impose the transfer without the possibility it is rejected by the central banker. The main conclusions of this chapter show that when the main values the transfer is best for '(e) l offer a menu of contracts to eliminate the incerti 8 dumbre to 1ebf sociada to the preferences of the agent, even at the expense of not eliminate the inflationary bias for any central banker. However, in case that has focused attention literature, where the principal does not value the transfer delivered, the adequate design of a menu of contracts is a mechanism to get both eliminate bias as inflationary uncertainty associated with the `` type''central banker. Finally, this chapter shows that in a context where the government appreciates the transfer delivered to the central banker and it is imposed by a mandatory regulation, the government has an incentive to propose a contract that does not remove the inflationary bias still being symmetric information. The fourth chapter is to analyze the interactions that occur in a monetary union between the implementation of structural reforms and the design of the common central bank. In this scenario, we show that if the monetary authorities have social preferences and countries not cooperating in the implementation of structural reforms, the formation of the monetary union can be counterproductive, namely, the welfare of member countries may worsen in relation to the situation in which each member state has its own currency. To prevent this from happening, the policies of structural reforms should be carried out in a coordinated manner. However, this approach is only an optimal alternative. The achievement of efficient outcome is possible if the inflation target of the central bank is chosen in such a way that is less than the company itself in a certain amount. This design allows achieve efficiency even in the event that structural reforms will not be implemented cooperatively but belonging to the national level, as is currently the case in the EMU. Finally, in this chapter we studied the consequences of an expansion of the monetary union to countries whose economies presents some structural rigidities greater than those of the original members of the union. Thus, we show that if the new states join without previously the necessary structural reforms, countries that now comprise the EMU will be harmed unless they redesign the institute issuing common. The fifth chapter aims to find and characterize technologies commitment based on the design of central banks, in a context where monetary policy generates externalities. These mechanisms must meet the following two conditions: first, to allow the aforementioned internalize external effects, and, secondly, that its implementation feasible. To that end, we analyze the adequacy of implementation, in this environment of open economy without inflationary bias, each of the three schemes traditionally raised in a closed economy in which there is such a bias. From this analysis we found the mechanism based on the legislative approach provides an advantage over the other two. Namely, it needs to be modified when the magnitude varies from disturbance. However, such technology has two problems commitment because: (a) does not constitute a Nash equilibrium in the design phase, so its implementation presents a credibility problem, and (b) the financial institutions have to be modified before variations in the type of disturbance. Therefore, we raised an alternative scheme based on the compensation mechanism for Varian (1994), which does not present the aforementioned drawbacks. This proposal allows achieve efficient solution but determined in a non-cooperative so the incentive for central banks and the implementation of monetary policy. The sixth chapter considers interactions estratégicasentre tax authorities in different countries where the government deficit generates negative externalities. In this context discusses the optimality of establishing rules that limit the discretion of the fiscal policy of countries that share the same coin. Considering a scenario extended to third countries leads us to conclude that the establishment of sanctions to deficits in EMU has two opposing effects on the welfare of member countries. On the one hand, these penalties diminish the negative externalities internal among countries in the union. However, apart from this aspect beneficial traditionally considered by the existing literature, we show that there is a second detrimental effect on member states. This is that when the euro zone countries are autoimponen greater fiscal discipline, it creates incentives for others' () areas to relax its monetary budgetary discipline, increasing international interest rates and declining world growth . Therefore, the maintenance of penalties to the deficit countries in the EMU can be counterproductive when the second effect is greater in magnitude than the first. The seventh chapter discussing an open economy model which takes into account the interrelationship between strategic fiscal policy and structural reforms in the countries of the EMU. In this context we show, first, that each government decides how much tax policy and structural reforms solely to individual well-being of their own country, structural reforms are being subóptimamente low while public deficits are subóptimamente high. In order to achieve efficient solution characterize a set of rules that penalize both the public deficit as a non-implementation of structural reforms. However, for this technology compromise allowing internalize the externalities generated needs to be credible. Since this ideal scenario lacks empirical support within the EMU, then contemplate a context where there are no such rules or, what is equivalent, but they are not binding established in practice and therefore not are credible. In this context, and given the European Commission's emphasis on the need to coordinate fiscal policies of member countries, we analyze the case where public deficits are determined not by rigid rules but through individual agreements to be drawn up the phase of the cycle. Under such conditions, we show that this kind of ad hoc tax coordination is also diminishing the incentive to carry out structural reforms, which may cause this tax cooperation is counterproductive. This may lead to the welfare of the member states is small compared to the case where the level of public deficit in each country is decided at the national level. Finally, we believe the recent arguments in favor of cooperative agreements between member countries on structural reforms and found that such agreements, by themselves, can not achieve the result efficiently.

Author: OLIVER RULLAN FRANCISCO JORGE.
Year: 2004.
University: ISLAS BALEARES.
Place of defense: FACULTAD CIENCIAS ECONOMICAS Y EMPRESARIALES.
Place of preparation: FACULTAD CIENCIAS ECONOMICAS Y EMPRESARIALES.

Summary: The aim is to study the current system of redistribution Spanish, recent reforms and analyzing the distributional effects of possible reforms discussed at the present time. Specifically, we focused on tax income and analyze on the one hand, the reform that happened in 1999. On the other hand, we compare the system of 1999 with other reforms based either in a single rate with a minimum income (income that is given to each adult regardless of their economic status or social), or a single rate along with a subsistence minimum (income exempt from taxation). One of the most appropriate instruments to analyze the system of a redistributive economics is the use of techniques microsimulation. They allow heterogeneity exploit any individual bases microdata. Therefore, the first step has been to develop a model of the tax system microsimulation Spanish. The analysis is done from different perspectives. First, an analysis of the redistributive effects of reforms through the microsimulation arithmetic. However, we must be aware that structural reforms such as simulated may have a significant impact in terms of efficiency. Therefore, secondly, we have introduced behavioral reactions in the microsimulation model. Specifically, they have created a model to characterize the labor supply of homes. The results allow study costs in terms of efficiency of the reforms previously commented and, in addition, allow us to draw conclusions about the welfare of individuals. Thirdly, we have shown social preferences implicit in the existing tax system imposed by the social planner with the methodology developed by Bourguignon and Spadaro (2000b). The conclusions drawn are that the system based on a minimum income and single rate is more redistributive the system in 1999 and achieved encouraging to the most needy. Therefore, the conclusion drawn is that we might favor to the most needy, and thereby reduce inequality, it is necessary to create a mechanism that will increase their disposable income, either through income tax or through other mechanisms, such as grants, pensions or transfers.

Author: MELGUIZO GARDE MARTA.
Year: 2005.
University: ZARAGOZA.
Place of defense: -.
Place of preparation: FACULTAD DE CIENCIAS ECONÓMICAS Y EMPRESARIALES.

Summary: The aim of the thesis is twofold one hand it is the formulation of an explanatory model of free transfers between parents and children, taking into account the cost of taxation according to laws currently in force in Spanish territory, and in the Autonomous Region of Aragon. On the other hand develops the same for a number of scenarios. The dissertation consists of two parts. The first is divided into two chapters. The first takes a look at the economic literature on profit transfers among family members highlighting traits such as transmissions show the empirical evidence available. The second describes the inheritance tax and gift Spanish and developed the methodology for tax planning in the lucrative transfers of elderly parents to children mature it will utilizarese in the rest of the work. In the second part of the thesis presents four applications of the theory. So are discussed in separate chapters: inheritance and donation; realiación several lucrative transfers and the possibility of combining a number of donations and inheritance, the constitution gratuitous use of an inter vivos and the subsequent cosolidación domain for acts inter vivos or causa mortis in the person of the beneficial owner or the owner knot; liquidation of the company acquisitions in the event that within the heritage assets are enjoying reduccin objective (such as the residence or business professionals) . Finally reflects the findings and literature.