MICROECONOMIC THEORY

Author: CARRERAS SOLANAS M. MERCEDES.
Year: 2003.
University: BARCELONA.
Place of defense: CIENCIAS ECONOMICAS Y EMPRESARIALES.
Place of preparation: FACULTAD ECONOMIQUES.

Author: FERNÁNDEZ BAGÒES MANUEL.
Year: 2003.
University: POMPEU FABRA.
Place of defense: DEPARTAMENTO DE ECONOMÍA Y EMPRESA.
Place of preparation: UNIVERSIDAD POMPEU FABRA.

Summary: Our society, as one of the few consensus between the various social sciences, live in the "age of knowledge". But it is not a totally new phenomenon. Throughout history many societies have experienced a similar sensation, and a large list of thinkers who have devoted themselves to its study. This paper addresses the issue starting from the perspective of Economic Theory. Knowledge is a "good" with a very distinctive characteristics. The quality with which we can assess and evaluate the knowledge of an individual depend on our own general knowledge. In the first trial, "Complexity of Knowledge and Biases Assessment" analyze the impact that this feature has on the quality of evaluations. We show how, in those areas where knowledge is complex and multidimensional, under conditions very general, the evaluation will be affected by a bias in favor of candidates who stand out in the same size which highlights the evaluator. This bias can also generate discrimination whether these groups differ in their profiles, as well as the evaluator or underestimate the differences, or can not observe the unsuccessful applicants. An empirical analysis of the decisions of assessing the contestants of the competition TV "weaker rivals" confirms previous assumptions. But paradoxically, although knowledge of the evaluator allows for a better assessment of external knowledge, it may reduce their need. Therefore from a theoretical point of view it is not possible to determine whether the possession of knowledge increases or decreases productivity gain knowledge outside. An empirical analysis will be required in each particular case. In general empirical studies have been based on the analysis of the correlation between contemporary strategies, being interpreted as a positive effect of the existence of a complementary relationship. However, this approach is subject to a number of criticisms. Firstly does not contemplate the existence of intertemporal effects. Secondly, it may be subject to an omitted variable bias. In the second article of the thesis proposing, in a dynamic and inter approach, a series of tests that are robust to both the existence of heterogeneity not observed as the omission of relevant variables not autocorrelacionadas. Applying this methodology to innovation strategies during 90 of the top 50 pharmaceutical companies, we find that - while simultaneously strategies is the correlation between positive intertemporalmente this proves to be negative. This finding seems to suggest a link between alternative strategies innovaddras, and so it calls into question the use of tests based on correlation contemporary. Finally another characteristic of knowledge is the fact that for transmission requires a code of communication. The value of a code of communication increases with the number of users. This network effect, if not internalized, will lead the company to take a variety of codes excessive. In turn, since a dynamic viewpoint, a code must adapt to a changing reality. But while the generation that initiates a reform suffers the costs, benefits reach all future generations. This creates some changes socially optimal not to become adopted. In the third and final section of the thesis, "Economic Theory of Babel", we show that there is a trade-between these two failures. If we correct static efficiency, reducing the excessive heterogeneity agravaremos the dynamic problem, further delaying the introduction 8 of camb 196 ios.

Author: CARRERAS SOLANAS M. MERCEDES.
Year: 2003.
University: BARCELONA.
Place of preparation: FACULTAD DE ECONOMIA.

Author: SANTA CRUZ COELHO DANILO.
Year: 2004.
University: AUTÓNOMA DE BARCELONA.
Place of preparation: ESCUELA DE POSTGRADO.

Summary: This thesis, Danilo Santa Cruz Coello consists of four chapters. The introduction is the first and briefly describes the contents of the following chapters. Chapter 2, in the context of a probabilistic model of voting proposed by Rae (1969), the author investigates the consequences of electing voting rules in the judgment of maximin. In the model, one vote rule is the minimum number of voters needed favorable to a proposal that this be accepted. The author demonstrates that the rule of voting that meets the criterion of maximin may be different from the simple majority that is the one that maximizes the zuma of profits expected of voters. The author gives a characterization of the voting procedures that meet the criteria of maximin. In chapter 3, two games that can be induced by the rule of genetic k names are proposed and analyzed. The author provides for each of the games a characterization of all the results of strong Nash equilibrium. These characterizations allow the author to discuss the preferences of players on different variants of the rule of k names. An important part of the rule of the names k is the process used to select k names that are nominated to the individual who makes the final decision. Six different selection rules that are actually used in the different decision-making bodies around the world are documented. In chapter 4, the author examines whether these rules satisfy the property of stability. One rule fulfills this property if it is always selects a set Weak Condorecet as there is a package with this feature. The author shows that all these six rules violate this property if voters do not act strategically. He then proposed two rules stable. Finally, the propociona two justifications for the extensive use of the rules unstable.

Author: ATECA AMESTOY VICTORIA M..
Year: 2004.
University: MÁLAGA.
Place of defense: FACULTAD DE CIENCIAS ECONÓMICAS Y EMPRESARIALES.
Place of preparation: UNIVERSITAT AUTONOMA DE BARCELONA.

Summary: Cultural property has a number of special features that make both its application and its supply are different from those of other goods económicos.Esta thesis focuses on aspects of the demand for cultural property, considering both theoretical and empirical determinants the demand and valoración.En specifically provides answers to three questions: how I operate determinants of the demand for cultural property in distinatas stages of the lives of individuals, II, what relationship is the demand for goods from one period on the application for subsequent periods and III what is the degree of effectiveness of various policy measures cultural.A through a trial theoretical and empirical three trials are considered temporary and social dimensions of the demand for cultural property. The trial poses a theoretical model of intertemporal consumer choice in which discusses the importance of cultural capital for the satisfaction of the need of assessment cultural.Esta variable can be explained by changes in the tastes of consumidor.Además, the problem is solved, exercises are performed static comparative studying the effect of changes in the exogenous variables of the model and concludes by analyzing the effect of different types of public intervention on the cultural capital. The first empirical test proposed and considered a model of patronage and demand respresentaciones teatrales.El second trial empirical analyzes the different methodological approaches that allow valuing cultural property market and does not have a contingent valuation exercise with the objective of determining the social preference on alternatives culturales.Por Finally, the third trial empirical proposes a methodology for the analysis of the needs inobservables that meets the individual through the method of analysis of subjective well-being.

Author: LÓPEZ ZORZANO RAFAEL ALBERTO.
Year: 2004.
University: POMPEU FABRA.
Place of defense: DEP. DE ECONOMÍA Y EMPRESA.
Place of preparation: DEP. DE ECONOMÍA Y EMPRESA.

Summary: THIS THESIS CONSISTS OF THREE CHAPTERS ON THE THEORY OF THE DECISION AND THE GAME. THE FIRST TWO ARE YOUR FOCUS AND TRATAN ON DESIGNS FOR A DECISION INDIVIDUAL INTERTEMPORAL IN CONTEXT OF ADICCIÓN. MAJOR FEATURES OF THESE ARE CONTEXTS: BUILDING HÁBITO (Repeated WHEN THE IMPLEMENTATION OF AN ACTION INCREASES THE DESIRE TO PERFORM); INTERNALIDADES INTERTEMPORALES (IF THE IMPLEMENTATION OF THE ACTION CREATE LONG-TERM EFFECTS, POSITIVE OR NEGATIVE IN THE FUTURE UTILITIES) ; E INCONSISTENCIA TEMPORARY (IF A PLAN IN AN EFFICIENT INITIAL PERIOD SPECIFIED LEAVES OF SERLO IN SEASONS UP. CHAPTER IN THE FIRST IS ESTUDIA A MODEL ADICCIÓN WITH INTERNALIDADES NEGATIVE AND SHOWN IN OPPOSITION TO SUGGEST THAT IMPORTANT WORK IN THIS AREA, WHAT A GREAT PLACE FOR DIVERSITY OF BEHAVIORAL PATTERNS AND THEREFORE SOME RESULTS PARADÓJICOS THESE WORK MUST BE REEVALUADOS. CHAPTER IN THE SECOND SET FORTH A FORMAL EQUIVALENCE BETWEEN ADICCIONES WITH INTERNALIDADES POSITIVE AND NEGATIVE. EQUIVALENCE IS ALLOWED TO ADDRESS THE TWO CONTEXTS TWO FACES OF ADICCIÓN AS ONE OF SAME COIN. FINALLY, THE THIRD CHAPTER ESTUDIA THE IMPLICATIONS OF HAVE AN AREA OF CHOICE IN THE FAMOUS GAME DISCRETO BEAUTY CONTEST.

Author: CONTRERAS MARIN ROBERTO CARLOS.
Year: 2004.
University: JAUME I DE CASTELLON.
Place of defense: FACULTAD DE CIENCIAS JURIDICAS Y ECONOMICAS.
Place of preparation: FACULTAD DE CIENCIAS JURIDICAS Y ECONOMICAS.

Summary: The thesis is divided into four chapters, the first introductory chapter that discusses the decisions of the Tribunal de Defensa de la Competencia on collusive agreements where yields of scale and / or product differentiation have influenced the creation, establishment or maintenance of the cartel. Additionally, three other theoretical chapters discusses the implications of scale that yields in the presence of differentiated products have on the stability of the cartel. The literature on the stability of the cartel with differentiated products has resulted from a theoretical point of view yields constant, and usually concludes that while more differentiated products are more stable is the cartel. Moreover, the empirical studies in most cases, arrive at a different conclusion. Specifically, there is evidence that the more homogeneous products are more stable is the cartel. Thus, originality and contribution of this thesis lies in the introduction of returns to scale in the model of stability cartel with differentiated products, finding certain production technologies where industries can coludir with a product more homogeneous than others if the parameter the diseconomies of scale is greater.

Author: XIFRE OLIVA RAMON.
Year: 2004.
University: CARLOS III DE MADRID.
Place of defense: FACULTAD DE CIENCIAS SOCIALES Y JURIDICAS.
Place of preparation: UNIVERSIDAD CARLOS III DE MADRID.

Summary: The thesis examines the causes and consequences of the loss of information in balance in three environments in which there is clear communication between players with conflicting interests and imperfect information. In the first, two experts are studying that communicate with each other, sending recommendations to a principal, and experience a positive or negative externality for the accuracy of the recommendation of his opponent. In the second, it presents a dynamic model agency where the ability of principal is not known with certainty and his interaction with the agent lets you learn about the same. In the third, it introduces a model of political economy that includes a mass media and a political candidate and looks at the conditions under which the former can be subordinate to the second equilibrium. Broadly speaking, the theory states that the uncertainty about the motivations of the issuer generates a discount information from the receptos in balance. Likewise, in case of endogenous information structures, such inefficiency is transmitted to the phase of acquiring information.

Author: Jiménez Jiménez Francisca.
Year: 2004.
University: JAÉN.
Place of defense: Facu. de Cien. Sociales y Jurídicas.
Place of preparation: Fa. CC. Sociales y Jurídicas.

Summary: This thesis comprises three chapters on the innovative methodology used as a tool of economic analysis: Experimental Economics. The first chapter is entitled "Strategic uncertainty and risk attitudes: the experimental connection." This research analyzes the behavior of individuals in trouble with decision vs. pure uncertainty. Uncertainty strategically in order to ascertain whether there is any relationship between them. Specifically, we studied the relationship between attitudes to risk that can show a person and their beliefs about the behavior that others take in a game of prisoner's dilemma. In the following two chapters he examines the problem of strategic uncertainty in the context of the Theory of Games. Thus, the second chapter is entitled "Teaching Nash Equilibrium and dominance: a classroom experiment on the beauty contest", is aimed at studying how to conduct strategic analysis through Guessing game called beauty contest, can be used as a tool teaching for teaching basic concept of game theory: the Nash Equilibrium. Finally, the third chapter of the thesis is entitled "Communication, coordination and competition in the beauty contest: eleven classroom experiments." In this paper, using the same strategic position in the previous chapter, we try to compare it with incentives that it can generate in the communication between subjects.

Author: Pulido Fernández Juan Ignacio.
Year: 2004.
University: JAÉN.
Place of defense: FACU. DE CIEN. SOCIALES Y JURÍDICAS.
Place of preparation: Facultad de Ciencias Sociales y Jurídicas.

Summary: Ecotourism is growing considerably in recent years worldwide. In Andalusia, with more than 1.4 million hectares of protected natural park figure (most permissive terms of the implementation of development strategies), the increasing demand for use turístico-recreativo these spaces makes the tourism in an interesting tool for economic development in areas with a production structure obsolete and serious problems of population decline. In this context, the Andalusian administration lacks an active policy of tourism management of nature reserves, which ensures their maximum utilization, while preserving its natural and cultural values. This thesis aims to develop a model for sustainable tourism management for natural parks Andalusians, based on the prior definition of the elements (goals, objectives and strategies) to be set up tourism policy of the administration Andalusian for these territories. Similarly, characterized the 24 national parks through the design of three types of variables: the degree of tourism development, intensity of tourism and tourism specialization.

Author: AMADOR MORERA FRANCISCO JAVIER.
Year: 2005.
University: LA LAGUNA.
Place of defense: FACULTAD DE CIENCIAS ECONÓMICAS Y EMPRESARIALES.
Place of preparation: FACULTAD DE CIENCIAS ECONOMICAS Y EMPRESARIALES.

Summary: In this thesis derive a number of properties theoretical model for allocating time DeSerpa that had not been addressed so far. Also, resulting welfare measures in units of time from a discrete choice model of random utility and its calculation is illustrated by an application based on a survey of the choice of mode of travel to work. Finally, it provides empirical evidence on the sensitivity of the measures available to pay for savings in travel time and the calculation of welfare measures from measures of individual provision to pay derived using information on the individuals observed elections delos by Bayesianos methods.

Author: BENITO OSTOLAZA JUAN MIGUEL.
Year: 2005.
University: PÚBLICA DE NAVARRA.
Place of defense: FACULTAD DE CIENCIAS ECONOMICAS Y EMPRESARIALES.
Place of preparation: FACULTAD DE CIENCIAS ECONOMICAS Y EMPRESARIALES.

Summary: The dissertation discusses the social determinants of individual behavior and the aggregated results, highlighting the justifications of such macroeconomic effects. The work focuses on generating iterations social externalities, which depending on the branch economic take different names such as neighborhood or iteraiones local effects. A pioneering work related iterations social or neighborhood effects, is the model of segregation Thomas C. Schelling, which under certain conditions, the decisions of individual residential location face producing segregated neighborhoods. This work suggests a reorientation of the original terms of the Schelling model, showing that simple individual behaviors produce complex economic systems, and how we can analyze them using techniques from the theory of complexity and theory of computation.

Author: INIESTA MARTINEZ PASCUAL.
Year: 2005.
University: CASTILLA-LA MANCHA.
Place of defense: FAC. CIEN. JURI. Y SOCI. TOLEDO.
Place of preparation: FAC. CIEN. JURI. Y SOCI. TOLEDO.

Summary: The fundamental aim of the thesis is to investigate the ability of prices to convey relevant information and under what conditions are such transmission. Furthermore, it analyzes whether this information can be effectively collected and interpreted by the consumer. Lastly, elaborates the impact this is having on consumer demand, and generally on the market demand, compared with the traditional viewing. The ability of prices to offer information has already been demonstrated by numerous studies, albeit under excessively restrictive assumptions, which projects a dark shadow over them. Especially detached from reality are the assumptions about the procedure by which consumers are able to deduce the information disclosed by the prices. Thus, these works have used individuals as too sophisticated to represent the decision-making of an ordinary citizen. That is why one of our main objectives has been to limit as much as possible the assumptions about the consumer. This will be working with an individual sound, with a reduced structural knowledge and significant restrictions on its ability to store past performance. According to the existing literature on the subject, the analysis of the information disclosed by the prices and its acquisition by the officers will be carried out under the two market structures primarily used: exchange pure and imperfect competition. In both cases, the consumer will move in an environment of imperfect and asymmetric information, as it could not be otherwise since the object of study. In the situation of imperfect competition, in addition to the above, it will be demonstrated that it is possible that prices provide information even in the event that all consumers are uninformed. This will enable state that, contrary to what traditionally considered, the existence of an array of fully revealing prices (of the information available in the market) is not the result of a positive externality generated by the agents informed, but there were firms enough patients. This result is of crucial importance, since it will allow to conclude that, even without an institution (public or private) that provides accurate information, a balance totally revealing possible.

Author: GUTIERREZ HITA CARLOS.
Year: 2005.
University: JAUME I DE CASTELLON.
Place of defense: FACULTAD DE CIENCIAS JURIDIQUES I ECONOMIQUES.
Place of preparation: FACULTAD DE CIENCIAS JURIDICAS Y ECONÓMICAS.

Summary: The three tests comprising the thesis developed in a context of imperfect competition, how does it affect the market structure in the formation of prices and quantity exchanged. The first two trials analyzed from a theoretical level of incentives to form cartels and integrate vertically by delas enterprises when they used as strategies pairs precio-cantidad, rather than compete on prices or quantities. Likewise, he examines how it affects the vertical integration increasing competition in the retail market. The theoretical results are in contrast to the empirical analysis, with an application to the Spanish electricity market. The third trial analizala formation of prices in a competitive space, where the location of establishments offering of input and vertical relationships between wholesale and retail market determine the location of retailers in terms of pricing policies adopted in the market wholesaler.

Author: Vida Peter.
Year: 2006.
University: AUTÓNOMA DE BARCELONA.
Place of defense: IDEA.
Place of preparation: Unitat de Fonaments de la Analisi de Economia.

Summary: Two players can make use of a trusted third party who mediates and partially resolves their conflict. Usually, the mediator should be aware of the situation and give suggestions to the players accordingly. However, a corrupt mediator can have a big influence on the outcome of the game. We single out a transparent mediator which can be safely applied in any two player game without loss of effciency. That is, the mediator is independent of the game and the desired outcome. Technically, we show that any correlated equilibrium of any two player game can be obtained as Nash equilibria of the game, extended with cheap, pre-play communication, where players can communicate through the proposed mediator. The key idea is that after the mediated communication the players can have a plain conversation. In particular, the mediating communication device is transparent, controllable and is the same for all games and for all equilibrium distributions. We extend the result to three player games. We implement the set of correlated equilibrium in Nash equilibria of an extended game where the players have a plain conversation. The central assumption is that players can be invited to eavesdrop a private conversation. We show that in case of four players, simple direct communication is sufficient for the implementation. We extend the results to games with incomplete information and to the set of communication equilibria.

Author: JARAMILLO GUTIERREZ AINHOA.
Year: 2006.
University: JAUME I DE CASTELLON.
Place of defense: FACULTAD DE CIENCIAS JURIDICAS Y ECONOMICAS.
Place of preparation: FACULTAD DE CIENCIAS JURIDICAS Y ECONOMICAS.

Summary: The main objective is to explore, in an experimental framework, how issues such as gender, attitude to risk or cultural differences of people influence their decision-making. First, we analyze two independent experiments. On the one hand, we study the behavior of subjects in general in a game type ultimatum under the structure of a labor market with the effect of introducing the realization of a real effort on the part of those who have no bargaining power in the game. Then we study the attitudes to risk of trial subjects through a test based on the panels lotteries Sabater-Grande and Georgantzís (2002). Once analyzed these two points, include a third analysis and study risk aversion as a reason for the different behavior of men and women in these negotiations, including the execution of an effort. Finally, we analyze these behavioral differences between men and women compared between subjects from different countries: Spain, Greece and the United Kingdom. The thesis is well organized into four distinct chapters: Chapter 1: "Salary Ultimatum Bargaining with Real Effort" Chapter 2: "Gender and Risk Attitudes" Chapter 3: "Gender and Risk Attitudes in Bargaining Experiments" Chapter 4: "A Cultural perspective of Gender effects in Bargaining Experiments "

Author: Medalho Pereira Isabel Maria.
Year: 2006.
University: AUTÓNOMA DE BARCELONA.
Place of defense: Universitat Aurtonoma de Barcelona.
Place of preparation: Universitat Autonoma de Barcelona, Dpt Economia i Historia Economica.

Summary: My research work focuses on the study of organizational problems in situations of collaboration. In particular, this thesis consists of three chapters in which analyzes issues of incentives in interdisciplinary research and collaboration agreements between companies and universities. The first chapter of my thesis, "Incentives for Interdisciplinary Research," is (so far, and according to my knowledge) the first work that characterizes formally interdisciplinary research through complementarity in the production and innate disadvantage in the costs of the desarrolo a new scientific area. My job demuenstra that when the objectives of the research are sufficiently demanding interdisciplinary production is preferable to specialized production. In the second chapter of the thesis, "Business-Science Research Collaboration under Moral-Hazard", as I analyze the characteristics of collaboration agreements are the result of an optimum contract between contracting parties. Besides, the kind of agreement can be an important tool when some incentive (or some) of the important resources for the collaboration is not contratable. The analysis is done in two dimensions: the structure of government in the agreement (centralized or decentralized), and problems of information structure that faces. Although a decentralized structure always choose projects that are nearest to the interests of the ruling party, the two structures will be able to use the draft as a mechanism to reduce the impact of moral hazard. The third chapter of the thesis, "Patents and Business-Science Research Partnership", presents an empirical study that relates the characteristics of patents to the process of research that preceded it. Using data from European patents, the results of this chapter are in agreement with theoretical predictions of the previous chapter of this thesis: the corporate identity of the organizations that make the research are visible on the characteristics of patents.