VERITAT I CORRECTION RULES. THE FONAMENTACIÓ OF COGNITIVISME IN JÒRGEN HABERMASAuthor:
FABRA ABAT PERE.
Year:
2004.
University:
POMPEU FABRA [
www.upf.edu].
Place of defense: DEPARTAMENTO DE DERECHO.
Place of preparation: UNIVERSIDAD DE BARCELONA.
Summary: One of the central philosophical discussions in metaética revolves around the value of cognitive enunciated practical. While, in general, is without doubt the possibility of submitting the study of the phenomena of nature to rational scrutiny, the possibility of establishing some kind of knowledge regarding the practical issues (morality, law, politics) still a topic of ongoing philosophical debate. Â Is there any way to determine the truth or the warmth of moral judgments? The positivism put this issue to a radical criticism. Even today we found a wide variety of positions on this issue, which affects both problems ontological (Â Is there any domain goal on which investigate?), As epistemological (Â Is it possible conecer something in this domain?). The German philosopher and sociologist JÃ ¼ rgen Habermas -crítico permanent division between positivist theory and practice has made a proposal from that address these issues has the peculiarity to respond affirmatively to the second of those questions without stating the first; aims cognitive defend a position regarding the practical issues, but without having to commit to moral realism. This proposal is based on a particular philosophical theory of rationality (communicative rationality) built on a concept of language (formal pragmatics), which in turn is based on a reinterpretation of its own theory of speech acts ( Austin, Searle), the concept of rule of Wittgenstein, interaccionismo symbolic RI Mead and tradition hermenèutica German (Humboldt to Gadamer). The dissertation focuses on the study and critical analysis of this core policy on which supported the proposal philosophical Habermas. In the first part (Caps. 1-3) are substantive grounds to move habermasiana reflection, as well as the philosophical context in which it develops. The central part of the work (Caps. 4-8) presents and analyzes the fundamentals filosófico-lingüsticos of the theory of communicative rationality, in other words, the agenda of the formal and pragmatic, in particular, the theory of meaning which incorporates, trying show problems - both constructive as substantivos- to this proposal must face and which critics have highlighted. It discusses the revisions to the theory that it has entered Habermas in his most recent, this theory is compared with the proposed regulations pragmatic Robert Brandom and made a hypothesis solution to the problems that the theory of the meaning of Habermas has still raised and that would make for a more extensive use of various conceptual categories from which Habermas already available in their own system. The last chapter discusses the analogy between 'truth' and 'corrective legislation' (or justice) from which Habermas wants to account for its cognitivismo on issues of practical reason and concludes that the recent self-criticism to which he has subjected his theory the truth -introduciendo budgets weakly realistic and renouncing his epistemologización- should also extend to his theory of justice.