GAME THEORY

Author: FRANCÉS CARRETTONI STELLA MARIS.
Year: 2003.
University: EXTREMADURA [www.unex.es].
Place of defense: FACULTAD DE C.ECONÓMICAS Y EMPRESARIALES.

Summary: This thesis presents two models, which can be modeled from the theory of games, which suggest possible causes of two economic phenomena of interest. First is the next problem. There are situations in which negotiations require the approval of more than two agents to ensure agreement. We have studied this aspect through a model of sequential negotiation of two periods with asymmetric information and offers one-sided, with three players - the valuation of one of them, which makes it offers, is common knowledge, and the other two, those who accept or reject these offers, it is information privadá. There are tradeoffs Bayesianos perfect in that offers the first period did not discriminate, that is not met ownership discriminant no learning, in the sense that a priori beliefs are equal to the beliefs post; there is a loss of efficiency with respect to the model of a period. If the discount factor is suficientenlente high, they are the only balances. There is also loss of efficiency in relation to the model of separate negotiations. Secondly, it formalizes a model in the context of signaling games, (1lese proposes to analyze the phenomena of undervaluation and spending on advertising in the Initial Public Offer of shares. In the Initial Public Offer of shares, they often are underestimated, in the sense that companies issuing shares at a price lower than the expected value of the dividend conditional on the information of investors, some companies that make an Initial Public Offer also have very high advertising spending. findings in this thesis reveal a possible explanation for these phenomena. argument that suggests is that because the information asirnétrica between the owners of companies and investors, with respec-.to the quality of companies, such phenomena arise as strategies balance of separation of good companies to signal their quality. To explain these phenomena are set conditions for the existence of the balance of separation and grouping. Owing to the multiplicity of equilibria, and to study the relationship between the default and the role spending as forms of advertising signage, defining the best balance of separation. This study concludes that advertising spending is a "perfect replacement" for the undervaluation, in the sense that companies can replace good quality underestimation with spending advertising, and get the same benefit. This is also a comparative static analysis on the best balance of separation. model used in some important assumptions, such as the transmission of information is only done it through the capital market , and the cost of imitation of the companies is an implicit cost, which sets it apart from existing models.

Author: RODRIGUEZ OÑA JESÚS.
Year: 2003.
University: SEVILLA [www.us.es].
Place of defense: FACULTAD DE MATEMATICAS.
Place of preparation: FACULTAD DE MATEMATICAS.

Summary: This memory is dedicated to a particular case of the decision-making process in which there are multiple decision-makers in competition, in which payments are rated vectorialmente results, situations known as vector games. It is considered the study of these games in the event that payments are made in a way that will be denominated games qualitative simple vector. The game theory has studied these situations only in cases where the dichotomous qualities are under the heading of simple games. Traditionally, it has been taken as a value or pattern of a coalition one or zero, depending on whether or not get the intended purpose. Coalitions that have a pattern are called coalitions winning and who have no employer zero losers and are thus naturally grouped into two families. However, simple games are a simplification of reality, in the sense that, in any situation in real life players are not confronted with an object of type quality, but face several objectives of this type. In this new situation, a coalition reach any part of them and have a pattern composed of ones and zeros, so coalitions are not classified as naturally as in the games simple. We will now have to establish the classification. This is the case under review, which will be called simple game Vector reserving hence the name of the game simple climb to the classical model. In Chapter 1 provides the basic definitions and examples of different games simple vector. In chapter 2, we study the games simple vector or not associated with a simple game vector operations have been done aggregation classes by union or intersection and / or marginalization and it is found that the composition of classic games is derived from a simple game and vector operations of this type. Not all players or coalitions play the same role in the games, for that in Chapter 3 defines the different types of coalitions and players and based on coalitions that are establishing a classification of the games are characterized in terms their players. In chapters 4, 5 and 6 deals with the distribution of the benefits of these games. In Chapter 4 deals with the division of joint. Specifically, it explores the core. In Chapter 5 is that, like a simple game climb supports a balanced representation through a set of weighted majority or a weighted vector game, a simple game vector representation weighted admits that, as in climb the case, allows dividing the value of the game between the players based on their weights. In chapter 6 discusses forms of distribution defined by the values associated with a game. It is the definition of value associated with cooperative games that take values in general vector spaces, defining them in the principles and axioms that players can accept.

Author: FRANCÉS CARRETTONI STELLA MARIS.
Year: 2003.
University: EXTREMADURA [www.unex.es].
Place of defense: FACULTAD DE C. ECONÓMICAS Y EMPRESARIALES.

Summary: This thesis presents two models, which can be modeled from the theory of games, which suggest possible causes of two economic phenomena of interest. First is the next problem. There are situations in which negotiations require the approval of more than two agents to ensure agreement. We have studied this aspect through a model of sequential negotiation of two periods with asymmetric information and offers one-sided, with three players; valuation of the other, those who accept or reject these offers, it is private information. There are tradeoffs Bayesianos perfect in that offers the first period did not discriminate, that is not met ownership discriminating, no learning, in the sense that a priori beliefs are equal to the beliefs after the event, there is a loss of efficiency in relation to the model of a period. If the discount factor is high enough, they are the only balanced. There is also loss of efficiency in relation to the model of separate negotiations. Secondly, it formalizes a model in the context of signaling games, which aims to analyze the phenomena of undervaluation and spending on advertising in the Initial Public Offer of shares. At the Initial Public Offer of shares, they are often underestimated, in the sense that companies issuing shares at a price lower than the expected value of the dividends is subjecting the investor information: some companies that make an Initial Public Offer also have advertising spending very high. The conclusions obtained in this thesis show a possible explanation for these phenomena. The argument is that it is suggested that due to asymmetric information between the owners of companies and investors with respect to the quality of companies, such phenomena arise as strategies balance of separation of good companies to signal their quality. To explain these phenomena are set conditions for the existence of the balance of separation and grouping. Due to the multiplicity of equilibria, and to study the relationship between the default and the role of advertising spending as forms of signage, defining the best balance of separation. This study concludes that advertising spending is a "perfect replacement" for the undervaluation, in the sense that companies can replace good quality underestimation with advertising spending, and get the same benefit. This is also a comparative static analysis on the best balance of separation. In the model used there are certain important assumptions, such as the transmission of information s done only through the capital market, and the cost of imitation of the companies is an implicit cost, which sets it apart from existing models .

Author: CARPENTE RODRÍGUEZ M. LUISA.
Year: 2004.
University: SANTIAGO DE COMPOSTELA [www.usc.es].
Place of defense: FACULTAD DE MATEMÁTICAS.
Place of preparation: FACULTAD DE MATEMÁTICAS.

Summary: The thesis is divided into three partes.En the first instrumental nature and applicability in the second part, it introduces axiomatically two values for games matriciales.Se alternatives to obtain characterizations of vilkas (1963) to the value of the extension Mixed an outcome that together characterize the utility and value scenarios strictly competitive. The second part is devoted to carectirizar two procedures for allocating a game in characteristic form for each game in the form estratégica.Uno of procedures was introduced in Von Neumann and Morgenstern (1944) and another is introduced in this trabajo.Asimismo, from a game in a strategic manner, characterized valuations based on the value of Shapley (1953), a coalition of the players who decide to cooperate. In the third part, are considered problems of bankruptcy in which creditors form a structure of unions to priori.Para these new situations, are introduced and new rules are characterized sharing, some of them are extensions of rules for classic problems of bankruptcy. Moreover, defining games (typically) from bankruptcy with unions in advance, explores properties of the same and different solutions to these juegos.Al end of this part, apply all these theoretical considerations to two sets of real data: some from the reorganization of Pacific Gas & Electric Company and others obtained from the application of milk quotas in the EU.

Author: OLAIZOLA ORTEGA M. NORMA.
Year: 2004.
University: PAÍS VASCO [www.ehu.es].
Place of defense: FACULTAD DE CIENCIAS ECONÓMICAS Y EMPRESARIALES.
Place of preparation: FACULTAD DE CIENCIAS ECONÓMICAS Y EMPRESARIALES.

Summary: The thesis is divided into two parts. The first part, which includes chapters 2, 3 and 4 discusses the endogenous formation of coalitions. Chapter 2 develops a comprehensive approach and defines a concept of appropriate solution for studying formation of coalitions. This approach is applied to the analysis of international environmental agreements in chapter 3 and the formation of cartels in chapter 4. The second part of the thesis, which includes chapters 5 and 6, discusses the choice of technology by businesses. Chapter 5 examines the incentives of firms to adopt a cost-saving technology and Chapter 6 examines the choice between a technology flexible and dedicated another. In both cases analyzed how the possibility of delegating decisions managers in the choice of technology

Author: LORENZO PICADO LETICIA.
Year: 2004.
University: VIGO [www.uvigo.es].
Place of defense: FACULTAD DE CIENCIAS ECONÓMICAS E EMPRESARIALES.
Place of preparation: FACULTADE DE CIENCIAS ECONÓMICAS E EMPRESARIALES.

Summary: This thesis is divided into two parts. - Problems trees Minimum cost is associated with each problem trees minimum cost of a game not cooperative extensively inspired by an actual situation. We are analyzing the Nash equilibrium of this game as well as the perfect balance in subjuegos and Pareto optimality in regard to payments made in balances. - Poblemas demands with restrictions: It explores how to distribute a resource among several agents with demands when we restrictions. These widespread problems of the bankruptcy and PERT or planning projects. Two rules are defined optimal in the sense Pareto according to the principles of equal and equal gain and loss are characterized axiomatically.

Author: MIQUEL FERNÁNDEZ SILVIA M..
Year: 2005.
University: BARCELONA [www.ub.es].
Place of defense: FACULTAD DE CIENCIAS ECONÓMICAS Y EMPRESARIALES.
Place of preparation: FACULTAD DE CIENCIAS ECONÓMICAS Y EMPRESARIALES.

Summary: In the interrelationship between operational research and game theory, the so-called emerging gaming operations research. These are cooperative games in which every possible coalition faces an optimization problem. Operations research techniques are applied in resolving these problems when determining the value of each coalition. Most of these situations has an underlying structure graph. And the players took the vertices and edges, representing control over part of the system or network. This thesis is based on two sets of known models of operational research: the standard set of tree fixed and the game assignment. In both cases, there is an underlying structure graph optimization problem facing each set of actors. In the first model, the graph is a tree. Suppose, for example, that each player owns a home in a particular town, and that all houses are connected to a power supply through a network, which is a fixed tree. Each house occupies a corner and every edge, which connects a house or two houses with the power plant, has a cost associated maintenance. Very different is the graph corresponding to the second model. This is bipartisan and represents a market of two bands. Consider, for example, a market for homes with two types of actors: Each seller has a home buyer dese compares a single home. Again, each agent has a vertex of the graph, sellers and buyers in different sides of the partition. Each artist, which represents the commercial connection between a buyer and a seller, is a benefit associated. So while in the first model, the optimization problem is to minimize the total cost of maintenance of the electrical grid, in the second, the problem is to maximize the total profit earned from the allocation of buyers and sellers. Despite being very different models, both are considered players located on the vertices of the graph, so that each player can hold at most one. In this thesis, this assumption is relaxed. Thus, one of the contributions of this thesis is to do the generalization of well-known models of cooperative game theory. In the first case, the game, you will call "Play tree with fixed players multi-localizados" and in the second case, "Play assignment with multiple ownership." In the rest of the thesis is contributing to the classic models to market two bands, the game assignment, as a band, the game of permutation. As regards the model of the games allocation, we believe that the same set of players can be found in more than one market situation. When a coalition has to choose one of the markets in which they do business, the situation can be represented by a maximum of a set of games assignment. On the other hand, if each coalition can participate simultaneously in more than one market and then add the benefits obtained, the state is represented by the amount of games assignment. Finally this thesis makes a contribution to the classical model of games permutation. In this regard, it is proposed a solution based on the cooperative relationship between games and allocation games permutation.

Author: CAMPOS FERNÁNDEZ FRANCISCO ALBERTO.
Year: 2005.
University: PONTIFICIA COMILLAS [www.upcomillas.es].
Place of defense: ALBERTO AGUILERA 25.
Place of preparation: E.T.S.I..

Summary: The thesis proposes a model key market lectricidad which takes into account the most relevant market uncertainty. On the one hand, for the representation of corporate behavior raises the Nash equilibrium in production quantities. On the other hand, for the representation of uncertainty is a measure of potential uses. Finally, for the resolution of the approach posibilista, it is easier to resolve than its counterpart probalistica, several algorithms have been applied to problems of inequality Variational. In the case studies analyzed were found that the proposed approaches allow the taking of decisiciones robust in the medium term, since they reduce the variability of beneficiós possible, positioning the companies producing market conditions expected by them, and without this necessarily involves a decrease in benefición expected. This latter behavior is due to the dual approaches primarl and shape the market through the approach to a game where there conficto of interest between companies (since the benefit of a company is affected by decisions taken by the rest) , and therefore a loss of expected profit of a company may increase the expected benefits of others.

Author: SAURI MARCHAN SERGI.
Year: 2006.
University: POLITÉCNICA DE CATALUÑA [www.upc.edu].
Place of defense: UNIVERSITAT POLITÈCNICA DE CATALUNYA.
Place of preparation: C2 Àrea Acadèmica NORD.

Summary: The globalization of the economy and the restructuring of the global trade routes, have led to an increasing demand for port competitiveness that has particularly affected the container terminals, which represent a cornerstone in the operation of much of the ports. This new stage of competitiveness affects technological improvements in equipment, optimization and process quality port, as well as the organization and division of labor port labor. Changes in the use of port capacity generate cost increases, which limits the profits from economies of scale of the vessels and is a limiting factor in the growth of its size. Within a PPP (Public-Private Partnership), with increasing participation of the private sector, it is important to quantify the relationship between the Port Authority, the concessionaire (operator) from the terminal and stevedoring company. This thesis applies a microeconomic approach to the container port terminals: optimizing these relationships through the theory of principal and agent, a variant of the Theory of Games. Once characterized relationships between the administration, the operator and the port labor are modeled contractual relationships through incentives (payment depending on results) and taking into account the usual moral hazard scenarios (huge investments whose profitability is subject to the future evolution of demand), information âocultaâ (cost structure and organization of the holding), mastery of the position in the market by the concessionaire and âmonopolioâ of society stevedoring and desestiba. The relationship between principal (Port Authority) and agents (operator and stevedoring company) is viewed as a âjuegoâ objectives but subject to different rules. There is a model Multiagent, multiárea, hidden information and intertemporal, which defines mechanisms tariff incentives to the dealer in shares of interest to the Port Authority, bearing in mind the impact on the port labor. It was formulated and solved (first-order approach) two stochastic mathematical programs, determining the terms of the profits expected from these players. Applications numerical model to a real case of a terminal concession of a port in the Mediterranean certify the soundness of the model developed: the charge and the rate of labor port encourage both the concessionaire and the stowage and desestiba, incorporating analysis not only the cost of the players but also the risk of demand and the level of risk aversion of the players. Finally, we suggest extensions of the research and the model developed.

Author: GUARDIOLA ALCALA LUIS ANTONIO.
Year: 2006.
University: MIGUEL HERNÁNDEZ DE ELCHE [www.umh.es].
Place of defense: CIENCIAS EXPERIMENTALES.
Place of preparation: DPTO. ESTADISTICA, MATEMATICAS E INFORMATICA.

Summary: In this thesis we analyze cooperative situations that arise when considering a model producción-inventario scarce and discreet review (model Wagner & Whitin, 1958). We define games producción-inventario, which combine the characteristics of the games inventory (Mecca et al. 2004) and games combinatorial optimization (Deng et al. 1999 and 2000). We show that these games always have deals that guarantee the stability of the entire system. Of all the deals we propose to the point of Owen and studying its main properties, providing three different characterizations of it. Later, we approached more general situations, in which we assume an additional cost (the fixed cost of purchase). We show that the cooperation also makes sense in this model and studying an extension parametric point Owen. We demonstrate their existence under certain conditions. Finally we focus on the situations, we call consolidated. In such situations it is possible to prove that the extension of point Owen is always a stable distribution. In the second part of the thesis, we study how they reach their cooperation in distribution chains composed of several vendors and a single supplier, which include a storekeeper who served as an intermediary. The goal of each vendor is to meet the demand for its own market (no competition). We demonstrate that there are always deals stable profit generated by joint cooperation. It proposes a certain desirable properties for these deals, with the objective of taking into account the contribution from the supplier to the increase in the benefit of the distribution system. Finally, we demonstrated that there is only one division that satisfies these properties, and that guarantees the minimum per capita income to all players.

Author: Perea Rojas-Marcos Federico.
Year: 2006.
University: SEVILLA [www.us.es].
Place of defense: Facultad de Matemáticas.
Place of preparation: Facultad de Matemáticas.

Summary: This thesis explores the possible cooperation in decision-making processes in which several players. The main contributions of this work are:-Extension of the concept of solving Owen for games production lienal, overcoming problems of justice that the concept of solulción presents. - Introduction and study of a new kind of cooperative games that emerges from a particular problem of distribution, supply chains games. - Introduction and study of a new kind of cooperative games, games in diameter, on graph type tree. Its properties were studied and calculation rules splitting efficiently. - Introduction of the games allocation multidimensional an extension of the classic games assignment. Its properties were studied and combined using algorithms approach to the pursuit of good rules of allocation.